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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
While returning home after attending a meeting at her work, Ms. Ross, a 
Salt Lake City police officer, was involved in an accident with the Plaintiffs in 
Tooele County. At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross, although not required to, 
had chosen to drive a Salt Lake City police vehicle for which she paid the City for 
the right to take the vehicle home. At the time, she was also transporting her 
1-year old son. In spite of the "coming and going" rule that provides that an 
employer is not vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees while 
commuting to and from work, the Plaintiffs claim that Salt Lake City is 
vicariously liable for Ms. Ross's conduct. 
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to judgment on the basis of two 
exceptions to the so-called "coming and going" rule - the "employer-provided 
transportation" exception and the "special errand" exception. The trial court found 
in their favor based upon the "employer-provided transportation" exception and 
did not rule upon the "special errand" exception. The City argues that the trial 
court created a heretofore non-existent test, failed to properly apply existing case 
law and failed to permit a finder of fact to review the relative factual merits of the 
parties' case. 
This Court recently stated in Clark v. Pagan, 2000 UT 371flj 9 and 19, 998 
P.2d268: 
1 
Moreover, as a general rule, whether one is acting 
within the scope of employment is a question to be 
determined by the finder of fact. . . . each case 
concerning scope of employment is very complex and 
must be analyzed in light of the facts present. 
This Court has also held, in relation to "scope of employment" cases, that it 
is reluctant "to formulate and impose a fact-specific rule of law because of the 
likelihood that no rule can be formulated that will adequately address all potential 
facts in these cases." Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 
1997). 
Contrary to these guiding principles, the trial court failed to take into 
account any facts pertaining to the relative positions, benefits and motivations in 
the subject employer-employee relationship, and, instead, fashioned a universal 
rule of law that a police officer "is essentially always on duty, at least when 
operating a police vehicle." 
I. 
THE "EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION" 
EXCEPTION TO THE "COMING AND GOING" 
RULE DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE 
Plaintiffs contend that there exists an "employer-provided transportation" 
exception to the "coming and going" rule. The City, on the other hand, contends 
that, to the extent such exception exists, it is more accurately described as the 
"employer-required transportation" exception. Curiously, Plaintiffs state that the 
2 
City's position "has no support in law." Plaintiffs' Brief p. 3.1 Such a claim is in 
direct contravention to the significant body of law, from this jurisdiction and 
others, which have been provided to this Court. See City's Principal Brief, Point 
II.A.2 From these decisions, it is evident that there is plentiful, long-standing and 
consistent body of law standing for the proposition that employer liability may be 
implicated when the employer required the employee to use the employer's 
vehicle. Employer liability, however, is not implicated when the employee simply 
has a choice of vehicles, exercises her option to use the employer's vehicle and, as 
a consequence of her choice, is required to compensate the employer for the use of 
such vehicle. Plaintiffs have failed to marshal credible case law to the contrary. 
In any event, the existence of such case law in Utah would be inimical to the 
Plaintiffs also incorrectly state that the City contends that the "coming and 
going" rule is inapplicable to negligence cases. Plaintiffs' Brief p. 5. The City has 
made no such contention; rather the City pointed out that the "owner-required 
transportation" exception, to date, has only been applied in workers' compensation 
cases where the burden of proof is substantially reduced and coverage is 
presumed. City's principal Brief, fn. 9. 
In Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) the Court found 
that "when an employee is required by his employer to bring his own vehicle to 
the place of business for use there, the employee is covered while going to and 
from work." Bailey, 398 P.2d at 546. (Emphasis added.) In State Tax 
Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053, the Court referred to the "requires the employee to 
use a vehicle" standard prior to finding a course and scope of employment. See 
also, Windsor Insurance v. American States Insurance, 2001 UT App. 98 j^ 13, 
418 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. ("[The employer] did not require [driver] to take her 
vehicle.") (Emphasis added.) See also, Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 936-37 ("it was 
the regular and definite duty to take the automobile"). (Emphasis added.) See 
also, VanLeewen, 901 P.2d at 285 ("[Employer] did not require [Employee] to 
perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a business instrumentality 
while traveling to and from work") (Emphasis added). 
3 
concept that the employer must be receiving benefits from the vehicle's use 
greater than that of the employee. See Martinson v. W.M. Insurance Agency, 606 
P.2d 256,258 (Utah 1988). 
In addition, the trial court, in this matter, failed to undertake any 
consideration of Ms. Ross's motivation in spite of the uncontested fact that she 
was not pursuing any police business at the time of the accident, was simply 
driving home from work with her 1-year old child, was outside her law 
enforcement jurisdiction and was unavailable for response. See Facts Nos. 4, 18, 
20 and 27. "An employee's conduct is usually not in the scope of employment 
where the employee's motivation for the activity is personal, even though some 
transaction of business or performance of duty may also occur." Jackson v. 
Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995). It is evident that Ms. Ross's 
motivation for such travel was simply to return home, with her son, and the 
benefits to the City if any, were de minimis. 
Plaintiffs place great stock in the fact that Ms. Ross was required to have her 
police radio on during her travels. The import, if any, of such requirement is 
certainly minimized by the dead areas for radio transmission in Tooele County. 
(See Fact No. 22) and the length of time it would take her to respond from Tooele 
County. 
More importantly, however, is that such "on-call" status is greater in theory 
than in practice. Ms. Ross has never been called out to respond from Tooele 
County and has never responded to an emergency in Tooele County. See Facts 24 
and 25. If she were called out, there is a specific procedure for her to be placed 
"on-duty" and at such time, Ms. Ross would be entitled to compensation and the 
City would be vicariously liable for her negligence. See Take Home Car Program, 
Policy D33-02-00.00 et seq., attached as Addendum 2 to the City's principal Brief. 
4 
The trial court had a duty to allow for the weighing of the employee's 
motivation versus benefits to the employer. Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258. The trial 
court erred when it simply relied upon a policy statement in the City's ordinance 
as the basis for its conclusion, without weighing the uncontroverted evidence of 
Ms. Ross's motivation, the relative benefit to the City or by refusing to allow the 
requisite comparison to go to a fact-finder.4 
Plaintiffs refer this Court to various extra-territorial decisions in support of 
their position that the mere use of the employer's vehicle subjects the employer to 
vicarious liability. In making this argument, Plaintiffs ignore the significant 
distinctions that are to be found in those cases. See the City's discussion of the 
following cases, cited by Plaintiffs, in the City's principal Brief: Tighe at p. 26 
(officer was "on-call" and "prepared to respond to any public emergency he may 
have encountered");5 Collier, pp. 26, 27 (holding substantially limited by DeJesus 
The trial court's error was exacerbated by its universal conclusion that a police 
officer "is essentially always on duty, at least when operating a police vehicle." 
City's principal Brief, Addendum 1, p. 5. Such an all-inclusive ruling is clearly 
contrary to this Court's admonitions that "[sjcope of employment issues are in 
general highly fact dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether 
or not the injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends upon the 
particular facts of each case'" Drake v. Industrial Comm V?., 939 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1997). 
5
 Officer Ross was not available for duty because she had her 1-year old son in the 
car. In addition, even the Nevada court recognized that its ruling was "not 
sufficiently broad and all inclusive to justify the conclusion that all law 
enforcement officers are always excluded from the rule that injuries sustained 
while traveling to or from work do not arise out of and in the course of 
employment." Tighe, 877 P.2d at 1035. (Emphasis in original.) The trial court, in 
5 
v. New York State Police, 467 N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1983), 
based upon whether an officer was inside or "outside the geographical area of his 
assigned employment"); and Medina, pp. 38, 39 (officer was required to take car 
home; officer was on active "on-call" status at time of accident; and New Mexico 
standard is that any employer-related benefit creates employer liability.) 
Compare Utah's different standard. See City's principal Brief p.39. See also 
Martinson 606 P.2d at 258. 
Plaintiffs also rely on a workers' compensation case, Montgomery County 
v. Wade, 690 A.2d 990 (Md. App. 1997), as a factually similar case. However, a 
careful reading of the decision demonstrates that the court applied a "time and 
space" test, not unlike that employed by this Court in the second prong of the 
Birkner test. Birknerv. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). 
See also City's principal Brief at p. 14. The Maryland Court found that "once she 
deployed on the streets of Montgomery County" she was in the scope of 
employment. Montgomery County, 690 A.2d at 996 (emphasis added). Officer 
Ross was not "on the streets" of Salt Lake City but was in Tooele County, on her 
way home, unavailable to respond to any police emergency and providing no 
benefit to its residents. Montgomery County avails Plaintiffs nothing by way of 
authority. 
the matter at bar, found just the opposite, i.e. an officer is "essentially always on 
duty 
6 
Plaintiffs rely upon another workers' compensation case - City of 
Springfield v. The Industrial Commission, 614 N.E.2d 478 (Illinois 1993). 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assessment of the factual foundations of that case, the court 
did not hold "that the operation of a police vehicle while monitoring the radio is 
itself sufficient to make that activity within the course of employment." Plaintiffs' 
Brief p. 9. 
In fact, the court recognized that, in Illinois, 
[t]he supreme court has stated that being "on-call" 24 
hours a day is not always determinative since it "does 
not necessarily follow that every injury suffered by a 
police officer is compensable." (citation omitted.) An 
injury must still be incidental to ones employment as a 
police officer. 
City of Springfield 614 N.E.2d at 480. (Emphasis added.) 
In assessing that issue, the court's actual factual finding, contrary to 
Plaintiffs' assertion, was that 
Claimant was returning to duty after lunch and was not 
only subject to being "on-call"; he had his radio turned 
on and was "on-call" to the extent he would have 
responded in the normal course to any request for 
assistance or emergency he encountered. 
City of Springfield 614 N.E.2d at 480. (Emphasis added.) 
7 
By contrast, Ms. Ross was not able to respond to a police emergency. See 
Fact No. 20. In addition, the Springfield officer was "on the streets" of 
Springfield while Ms. Ross was beyond her jurisdiction.6 
Similarly, in commenting on City of Springfield and other like cases, the 
United States Court of Federal Claims stated: 
The common thread among all going and coming rule 
exceptions is that, in each instance, the employer 
derives a benefit from the employee's act of traveling 
to and from work. 
Davis v. U.S., 50 Fed. CI. 192, 202 (Fed. CI. 2001). 
In the instant case, the trial court made no effort to find or define the 
employer benefit, relying, instead, on a "public interest" statement in the City's 
"take-home car ordinance." Such reliance resulted in the abrogation of a fact-
finder's duty to balance the relative benefits to the employer as opposed to those 
of the employee. See Martinson 606 P.2d at 258 and City's principal Brief at pp. 
36-37. Contrary to Plaintiffs' position, City of Springfield, for whatever value it 
has, does not support Plaintiffs' position. Rather, it supports the City's position 
that the officer's motivation must still be in furtherance of her employment as a 
6
 A police officer is not always within her jurisdiction in Utah and her extra-
territorial authority is not without limits. See Point LB. of the City's principal 
Brief. 
7
 As pointed out in the City's principal Brief at p. 37-38, the City's ordinance has 
no effect in Tooele County. 
8 
police officer. The trial court did not take such matter into account and such 
failure was reversible error. 
Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon Johnson v. Dufrene, 433 S.2d 1109 (La. 1983). 
Their reliance is equally misplaced in this case. Therein, the court held: 
The specific inquiry is whether the employee's tortious 
conduct "was so closely connected in time, place and 
causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a 
risk fairly attributable to the employer's business, as 
compared with conduct motivated by purely personal 
considerations . . ." 
Johnson, 433 S.2d at 1112. 
In Johnson, the court found that the police officer, because of a specialized 
assignment, was "in critical demand at all times." Id. Accordingly, the officer 
was directed by his supervisor to use the police vehicle. These facts are 
materially different from Officer Ross's who was not required to use a City 
vehicle; it was solely her choice to use a City vehicle; she paid for the privilege of 
driving the City vehicle; and she could have, if she chose, used her personal 
vehicle. Johnson is wholly consistent with the "employer-required vehicle" cases 
from this jurisdiction cited in the City's principal Brief at pp 21 - 29. 
Johnson ys obvious lack of support for Plaintiffs' position is bolstered by the 
Louisiana court's further consideration of Johnson. In Hanson v. Benelli, 719 
In fact the officer was "duty-bound to use his police car rather than another." 
Johnson, 433 So.2d at 1113. (Emphasis added.) Ms. Ross's use was strictly 
optional. 
9 
So.2d 627, 634 (La.App. 1998), the court specifically recognized Johnson and 
limited its holding to its unique facts.9 Further the court noted: 
For us to affirm the finding that Lt. Benelli was in the 
course and scope of his employment we must hold that 
a New Orleans police officer is in the course and scope 
of his employment as a policeman whenever he is 
involved in an accident driving a car owned by NOPD. 
Neither the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat 
superior nor the jurisprudence support this proposition. 
Hanson, 719 So.2d at 634 (emphasis in original). 
Again referring specifically to the Johnson case, the court, in a subsequent 
matter, held: "[T]he most recent jurisprudence indicates a retreat from the 
traditional rule imposing liability on a governing body for the alleged negligence 
of an off-duty police officer if any connection to his employment exists." Wright 
v. Skate County, 734 S.2d 874, 881 (La.App. 1999). 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Johnson is suspect in that it has not only been limited 
to its facts but, in Hanson, the Louisiana court directly rejected Johnson for the 
very conclusion reached by the trial court in the instant matter i.e. that neither the 
policy behind the doctrine of res judicata nor the case law support a conclusion 
that a police officer is always in the course and scope of his employment when in a 
police vehicle. Plaintiffs' extra-territorial references do nothing to further their 
argument and when read fully, are harmonious with those cases relied upon by the 
9
 "The evidence established that [Johnson] was the only employee trained [in 
certain functions]. Hanson, 719 So.2d at 634 (emphasis in original). 
10 
City. Utah's position, as argued by the City, is internally consistent and consistent 
with the vast body of law from other jurisdictions. 
II. 
MS. ROSS WAS NOT ON A "SPECIAL ERRAND" 
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT 
Plaintiffs, in their Second Point, and with reference to the City's reliance 
upon VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 
1995) accuse the City of having "a serious misunderstanding of the doctrine of 
[special errand] or attempt to confuse this Court into considering extraneous 
matters." Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 12. In connection with that charge, Plaintiffs assert 
that "there was no contention made in VanLeeuwen that the employee was on a 
special errand." Id. 
Plaintiffs' charges ring hollow indeed when a review of VanLeeuwen is 
undertaken. Therein, the Court specifically concluded: 
VanLeeuwen was not on an employment related 
"special errand" or "special mission" at the time of the 
accident. VanLeeuwen was not being compensated for 
his time spent traveling between his home and 
Custom's office. The accident did not occur on 
Custom's premises, nor did VanLeeuwen's duties 
require him to be at the place where the accident 
occurred. The risk that caused the accident was one 
common to the traveling public and was not created by 
duties connected with his employment, (citation 
omitted) We therefore conclude that the 
Commission's finding that VanLeeuwen received the 
11 
majority of the benefit from his use of the truck was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 285. 
To counter the City's warranted reliance on VanLeeuwen, Plaintiffs also 
submit Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). In 
that regard, Plaintiffs submit a portion of this Court's historical review as the 
holding of that case. See Plaintiffs' Brief p. 12. Such quote, however, is taken 
wholly out of context and, rather than state the rule of law suggested by Plaintiffs, 
in fact, states something very contrary. Plaintiffs have omitted the opening and 
limiting clause: 
[T]he emergent trend in cases dealing with injuries that 
occur during the employee's travel to employment-
related educational seminars or training programs is to 
find an employment connection if the travel can be 
deemed an "act outside an employee's regular duties 
which is undertaken in good faith to advance the 
In support of this conclusion, the Utah court referred to and relied upon Rinehart 
v. Mossman-Gladden, Inc., 432 P.2d 991, 992 (N.M. 1967). Therein the court 
noted the same factors as recognized by the Utah court and additionally noted that: 
[T]he basic principle or premise underlying the "exceptions" to the going 
and coming rule and the clue to their proper limits is found in the principle 
that the injury is compensable only where the journey is an inherent part of 
the service for which the employee is compensated or where the travel itself 
is a substantial part of the service performed. (Emphasis added.) 
Such "basic principles" are virtually identical to those enunciated for 
negligence cases in Birkner and clearly do not apply to a voluntary take home 
program in which the employee pays for the use of her employer's vehicle and 
when the employee admittedly was not pursuing any police business at the time of 
the accident. See Fact No. 27. 
12 
employer's interest, whether or not the employee's 
own assigned work is thereby furthered" 
Drake, 939 P.2d at 183 (emphasis added) (italics represent the only portion quoted 
by Plaintiffs). 
It is evident that Plaintiffs have taken a partial quote and contorted its 
meaning beyond the Court's intent. After the Court concluded its historical 
review in Drake, it reasoned that the above-referenced test may be sufficient for 
travel for educational and training purposes but was not a sufficient measure when 
considering whether travel relating to regularly scheduled and reoccurring meeting 
is a special errand.11 In deciding that such regular travel was not a special errand, 
this Court referred, with approval to Arthur Larson, Larson's Law of Workmen's 
Compensation §§ 16.11 and 16.13. Therein, the treatise suggest that the "coming 
and going" rule may have an exception when the travel involves "the trouble and 
time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard or urgency of 
making it in the particular circumstances . . ." The court also approved of 
Larson's comments that a "court must consider the 'relative regularity or 
unusualness of the particular journey.' Larson explains that 'if the journey is 
relatively regular, whether every day, . . . or at frequent intervals,... the case 
begins with the strong presumption that the employee's going and coming trip is 
expected to be no different from that of any other employee with reasonably 
regular hours and place of work.'" Drake 939 P.2d at 183. 
11
 The meeting from which Ms. Ross was traveling was a regularly scheduled 
meeting. See Fact No. 5. 
1 -5 
Clearly, these standards do not bring Ms. Ross into the special errand 
exception. She was doing nothing more troublesome, inconvenient, hazardous, 
urgent or irregular than simply driving home from work - a task undertaken by 
Ms. Ross and the commuting public on a daily basis. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Drake is even more questionable given the fact that 
this Court found that she was not on a special errand even though, 
Drake's [Salt Lake] supervisor askedher to pick up 
[certain business documents] from the Ogden office 
two or three days a week on her way home. At the 
same time, she was also directed to deliver [such 
documents] to Ogden. On the days she made 
deliveries, Drake took a five-to-six-mile detour from 
her normal route home. 
Drake, 939 P.2d at 179. (Emphasis added.) 
On those facts, this Court found that the deliveries "were not 'special 
errands.'" Drake, 939 P.2d at 184. Given the presumptions, in favor of workers' 
compensation coverage, a finding that there was no "special errand" under the 
Drake factual circumstances requires a like finding under the more rigorous 
negligence standard where Ms. Ross was simply driving home from a regularly 
scheduled meeting and was pursuing no police business. 
Plaintiffs also attempt to ignore the relevant Utah case law by trying to 
obviate and ignore this Court's holding in Lundberg v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 
The Court cited, with approval, its prior decision in a negligence case, Lundberg 
v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (1970) where the Court "declined to find 
that an employee had engaged in a special errand where the activity, travel to an 
early morning meeting, was not an 'unusual occurrence.'" Drake, 939 P.3d at 
183. 
14 
174 (Utah 1970). Plaintiffs' efforts to distinguish the "specially called" meeting 
that "was not an unusual occurrence" (Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176) from the 
"regularly scheduled" (see Fact No. 5) meeting attended by Ms. Ross is as 
ineffectual as it is transparent. Lundberg is valuable and guiding stare decisis in 
this matter and Plaintiffs5 efforts to draw a distinction where none exists does not 
alter its application to this matter. 
Again resorting to foreign law when relevant Utah law abounds, Plaintiffs 
refer this Court to Mikkelson v. N.L. Industries, 370 A.2d 5 (N.J. 1977). That case, 
in a workers' compensation context, applied a "mutual benefits" test. Utah does 
not appear to have adopted that test, as such, but rather has adopted the similar 
"dual purpose doctrine." Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 P.2d 934, 
937 (Utah 1989). In Clark 2000 UT 37 f 23, 998 P.2d 268, this Court reaffirmed 
its holding in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Utah 1991) 
that the "dual purpose rule and substantial deviation tests are not departures from 
the Birkner criteria . . ." Even the "dual purpose doctrine" characterization does 
not aid Plaintiffs' position. Citing Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258 for support, the 
Whitehead Court held: 
[I]f the predominant motivation and purpose of the 
activity is in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employee, even though there 
may be some transaction of business or performance of 
Plaintiffs have not previously argued the "mutual benefits" test or the "dual 
purpose doctrine" and to the extent they are viable issues, they require fact finding 
not present in this case. See Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258. 
duty merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the 
person should not be deemed to be in the course of his 
employment. . . . 
One useful test is whether the trip is one which would 
have required the employer to send another employee 
over the same route or to perform the same function if 
the trip had not been made.14 
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937. 
Given the uncontroverted facts of this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the 
"transaction of business or performance of duty" was virtually non-existent and 
the activity leading to the accident was simply one in common with the traveling 
public - going home after work. Once again, Plaintiffs5 foreign law lends no 
support for their position and to the extent such foreign cases are of any aid, they 
demonstrate that the City's position is more favorably supported. 
Similarly, other foreign jurisdiction workers5 compensation case relied 
upon by Plaintiffs are without significant relevance to this matter. In Perez v. 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 152 Cal.App.3d 60 (Cal App. 1984), the 
court based its "special mission" conclusion upon the fact that the employer 
specifically consented to the employee's trip to a union meeting to vote on a 
contract ratification "in order to ward off a strike.55 The court found that having a 
contract and avoiding a strike was a material benefit to the employer. 
Clearly, the City would not have sent another police vehicle to Tooele County. 
Ms. Ross's purposes for being at that location at that time were of no concern to 
the City. 
16 
However, the court also recognized, in a holding more pertinent to this 
matter, that injuries sustained in conjunction with a regularly scheduled meeting 
were not compensable. Perez, 152 Cal.App. at 64.15 
Plaintiffs string together a further litany of primarily California workers' 
compensation cases.16 Each case essentially stands for the proposition that any 
employee called back to work, required to work overtime or attend a meeting, is 
1 n 
on a special errand. Suffice it to say that Utah has not adopted the liberal 
California standard. To do so would require a wholesale reversal of a significant 
body of case law, a major change in long-standing workers' compensation 
coverage and would result in moving Utah's jurisprudence from the list of 
majority jurisdictions into that of the minority. In addition, none of these cases is 
a negligence case that takes into account the various factors to be considered by a 
fact finder when concluding that vicarious liability may be appropriate. 
Plaintiffs' penchant for citing foreign workers' compensation law to the 
exclusion of guiding Utah law produces little profit. This Court need look no 
15
 The "regularly scheduled meeting" issue was dealt with in Lundberg v. Cream 
O Weber, 465 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1970) and this Court concluded that attendance 
at these meetings were not "special errands." 
16
 See Plaintiffs' Brief p. 13. The City has previously demonstrated that Plaintiffs' 
foreign cases do not sustain a conclusion that there is universal acceptance of their 
postulates. See City's Principal Brief, pp. 27-28. 
It is also worthy of note that unlike the California employees who were required 
to attend some work-related matter, Ms. Ross voluntarily requested the 
assignment. (See Fact No. 3.) 
further than its own consistent and main-stream decisions to demonstrate the trial 
court's error. 
III. 
THE BIRKNER RULE IS APPLICABLE 
IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 
Plaintiffs, in their third Argument appear to contend that the course and 
scope of employment found in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1989) is of no moment when reviewing an exception to the "coming and going" 
rule. If this is, indeed, their argument, they are incorrect. 
Plaintiffs' claim that the truth of their premise can be seen by the fact that 
none of the "coming and going" cases ever discuss the Birkner criteria. Plaintiffs' 
Brief p. 14. The reason for this is clear. With the exception of Whitehead, 801 
P.2d 934, virtually every "coming and going" case is a workers' compensation 
matter with its unique presumptions that are inapplicable to negligence cases. 
It is axiomatic that in order for vicarious liability to attach under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, the employee must have been within the scope of 
his employment. Jackson, 891 P.2d at 1391. The "coming and going" rule does 
not alter that. In Drake, this Court has indicated as much, in the workers' 
compensation context, when it summarized the special errand concept as when 
"the employee engages in a special activity which is within the course of 
18
 The City contends that Birkner is applicable but noted, in its principal Brief at 
fn. 7, that even if Birkner is inapplicable to the "coming and going" rule, Plaintiffs 
still cannot prevail for the reasons set forth in the remainder of the City's principal 
Brief. Such contention is reaffirmed and reinforced in the Reply. 
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employment... " Drake 939 P.2d 183. (Emphasis added.) More importantly, this 
Court has also recognized the concept in a negligence context. In Lundberg, this 
Court stated: "it is fundamental that even though the employee may not be at a 
regular place of work, he must be performing a duty for his employer, or one 
which is so connected with his employment as to be an essential part thereof " 
Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176 (emphasis added.) 
The "coming and going" rule is nothing more than shorthand for this 
Court's holdings that travel is not normally within the scope of employment. In 
order to avoid the rule, the parties seeking to benefit from vicarious liability must 
establish an exception demonstrating that the employee was in the course and 
scope of his employment at the time of the injury. The Birkner test succinctly sets 
forth the elements for making that determination. 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seem to suggest that the "coming and going" 
rule presents its own set of criteria, distinct and separate from those contained in 
Birkner -although they do not direct the Court to the nature or quality of those 
criteria, except by a passing reference to State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, (Utah 1984). However, even in State Tax 
Commission, which has been severely restricted to its factual context by Drake, 
939 P.2d at 183, this Court addressed the special errand claim by presenting it in 
the context of an "activity which is within the course of employment. . ." State 
Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1054. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs' efforts to create 
a body of law for exceptions to the "coming and going" rule, separate and distinct 
10 
from "scope of employment" cases, ignore the natural and inherent nexus between 
the two. One simply cannot claim an exception to the "coming and going" rule 
without an inquiry into whether the pertinent facts implicate the employee's 
"scope of employment." The Birkner standards facilitate that inquiry. 
Finally, Plaintiffs seem to suggest that the simple fact that Ms. Ross had 
attended a work-related meeting is sufficient to find employer liability. In Utah, 
"mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the employer." 
VanLeeuwen 901 P.2d at 285 citing Lundberg 465 P.2d at 176. Plaintiffs were 
required to show more than "mere arrival at work." They were required to 
demonstrate the elements of Birkner and they failed to do so. 
The "coming and going" rule, when applied to a negligence matter should 
be implemented in a manner consistent with "scope of employment" law as set 
forth in Birkner, 771 P.2d 1053, the balancing tests of Martinson, 606 P.2d 256 as 
adopted to negligence cases by Whitehead 801 P.2d at 937, and their significant 
progeny. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter presents itself to the Court with the following uncontroverted 
facts: 
Ms. Ross was 
1) off duty; 
(2) simply traveling home with her infant child; 
(3) outside the jurisdiction of Salt Lake City; 
20 
(4) in a car she alone chose to drive; 
(5) in a car she paid to drive; 
(6) traveling along the route she chose; 
(7) performing no police duties; and 
(8) unable to perform any police duties. 
From those facts, the following conclusions result: 
1. She was not performing any work related to the police work she "was 
hired to perform; 
2. Her conduct did not occur within the hours and spatial boundaries of 
her employment; and 
3. Her motivation for being at the time and place of the accident was 
motivated solely by her commute home and not by the purpose of serving the 
City's interest. 
There is no credible evidence to sustain the trial court's judgment that a 
police officer is "essentially always on duty, at least when operating a police 
vehicle." The trial court failed to apply the correct tests, relied on inapposite 
foreign case law, failed to balance the respective benefits between employer and 
employee and failed to recognize the role of the fact finder in "scope of 
employment" cases. 
The trial court erred in its judgment and such judgment should be reversed. 
Judgment should either be entered on behalf of the City or the matter should be 
0 1 
sent back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the case law of 
this State. 
^ Respectfully submitted this 2 ^ day of March, 2002 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake City 
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